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Security Remarks on a
Convertible Nominative Signature Scheme
Guilin Wang and Feng Bao
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2 R)
21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Singapore 119613
{glwang,baofeng}@i2r.a-star.edu.sg
Abstract. A nominative signature scheme allows a nominator (i.e. the
signer) and a nominee (i.e. a designated verifier) to jointly generate
and publish a signature so that only the nominee can check the validity of a nominative signature and further convince a third party to
accept this fact. Recently, Huang and Wang proposed a new nominative signature scheme at ACISP 2004, and claimed that their scheme
is secure under some standard computational assumptions. In this paper, we show that their scheme is not a secure nominative signature,
since it fails to meet the crucial security requirement of verification
untransferability. Specifically, we present an adaptively chosen-message
attack against their scheme such that the nominator can determine
the validity of a new message-signature pair with some indirect help
from the nominee. Moreover, we point out that this attack enables the
nominator to demonstrate the validity of nominative signatures to a
third party. Therefore, the Huang-Wang scheme does not meet confirmation/disavowal untransferability either.
Keywords: Nominative signature, digital signature, attacks, information security.

1 Introduction
As an important primitive in modern cryptography, digital signatures are widely
used to provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation for authenticating
electronic messages. Standard digital signatures are universally or publicly verifiable. That is, according to a publicly known signature verification algorithm
anybody can check whether an alleged signature-message pair is valid or not
with respect to a given public key. However, this may not be a desired property
in some situations, where messages to be authenticated are personally private
or commercially sensitive. To restrict the universal verifiability, therefore, some
variants of digital signatures have been proposed, such as undeniable signatures
(US), designated confirmer signatures (DCS), and nominative signatures (NS).
In undeniable signature schemes [4, 15, 9], the validity of a signature can
only be verified under the cooperation of the signer. Undeniable signatures find
various applications, such as licensing softwares, e-cash, e-voting, e-auctions,
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etc. In [6, 1, 11], designated confirmer signatures (DCS) are further proposed
to guarantee that the validity of signatures can also be verified under the help of
a semi-trusted party, called designated confirmer. This is a useful enhancement
for verifiers, since they may need to check a signature’s validity even in the case
the signer is unavailable, due to some subjective or objective reasons.
Compared with these schemes, nominative signatures [14, 13] hand over the
power of signature verification to the verifier. That is, without the help of a
designated verifier (called nominee), anybody including the signer (called nominator) cannot determine whether an alleged signature-message pair is valid
or not. Actually, nominative signatures can be considered as the dual concept
of undeniable signatures. In addition, as suggested in [14, 13], nominative signatures have potential applications in the scenarios where a signed message
is personally private or commercially sensitive, such as a tax bill, a medical
examination report, an ID certificate, etc.
In 1996, Kim et al. [14] first introduced the concept of nominative signatures. Intuitively, a nominative signature scheme allows a nominator (or signer)
and a nominee (or verifier) to jointly generate and publish a signature for an
arbitrary message. Different from standard signatures, however, only the nominee (holding his/her own private key) can verify the validity of a published
nominative signature. Furthermore, if necessary, the nominee can also convince
a third party to accept this fact by proving (in zero-knowledge) that such a
signature is indeed issued by a specific nominator.
At ACISP 2004, Huang and Wang [13] mounted an attack showing that Kim
et al.’s scheme is not nominative, since the nominator can also verify and prove
the validity of a signature to a third party. To avoid this weakness, they further
proposed a new nominative signature scheme. Actually, their scheme are also
convertible. That is, the nominee can also convert a nominative signature into
a publicly verifiable one, if necessary.
Soon, Susilo and Mu [18] claimed that the Huang-Wang scheme is not nominative either. Specifically, they described three deterministic algorithms that
allow the nominator alone (i.e., without any help from the nominee) to (a) verify the validity of a nominative signature, (b) convince a third party that the
signature is valid, and (c) convert the signature into a publicly verifiable one.
However, Guo et al. [12] pointed out that all these attacks are actually invalid.
In particular, they showed that there exists no deterministic algorithm allowing the nominator to check the validity of a published nominative signature
if the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard. So, it is still not clear
whether the Huang-Wang scheme is a truly secure nominative signature against
adaptively chosen-message attacks.
In this paper, we present a detailed security analysis of the Huang-Wang
scheme [13] and show that it is indeed not a secure nominative signature scheme,
since it fails to meet the crucial security requirement: verification untransferability. Specifically, we identify an adaptively chosen-message attack against their
scheme such that the nominator can determine the validity of a new messagesignature pair with some indirect help from the nominee. Moreover, we point
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out that this attack enables the nominator to prove the validity of nominative
signatures to a third party. Therefore, the Huang-Wang scheme also does not
satisfy the confirmation/disavowal untransferability, which requires that except
the nominee anybody should be unable to convince a third party accepting the
validity of an alleged signature. In addition, we analyze the reasons why their
scheme is insecure.
This paper is organized as follows. We first review Huang-Wang scheme in
Section 2, and then present our attacks in Section 3. Finally, a brief conclusion
is given in Section 4.

2 Review of the Huang-Wang Scheme
2.1 Security Model of Convertible Nominative Signature
Definition 1 (Syntax of Convertible Nominative Signatures). According to [13], a convertible nominative signature scheme consists of a six-tuple
(KG,Sig,Ver,Conf,Conv,UVer) of algorithms and protocols:
1. KG is a probabilistic algorithm to produce public/secret key pairs (pks , sks )
and (pkv , skv ) for a nominator S and a nominee V respectively, when a
security parameter 1n is given.
2. Sig is an interactive protocol between the nominator S and nominee V to
generate a nominative signature σ for a given message m.
3. Ver is a deterministic algorithm so that the nominee V can verify the validity
of a presumed signature-message pair (σ, m) using V ’s private key xv .
4. Conf is an interactive confirmation/disavowal protocol between the nominee
V and a third party T so that V can convince T to accept the validity
or invalidity of a presumed nominative signature. Conf should satisfy the
regular requirements of both completeness and soundness.
5. Conv is a polynomial-time algorithm that allows the nominee V to convert
a nominative signature into a universally verifiable signature.
6. Uver is a deterministic algorithm that allows anybody to verify the validity
of a converted nominative signature.
In [13], a convertible nominative signature is called secure if it satisfies the
following three security requirements: unforgeability, verification untransferability, and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Unforgeability requires that
except the nominator, anybody including the nominee cannot forge a valid
nominative signature on behalf of the nominator with non-negligible probability. The essential meaning of verification untransferability is that anybody
including the nominator cannot determine the validity of a presumed nominative signature with non-negligible advantage, even if he/she already checked
the validity of many other signatures with the nominee. The last requirement
means that anybody including the nominator cannot convince a third party to
accept the validity or invalidity of a given nominative signature, even if he/she
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already interacted with the nominee for many times. In the following, we recall
the formal definitions of those three security requirement, which are specified
in [13].
Definition 2 (Unforgeability). Let F be a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
algorithm, called forger, who takes input the security parameter 1n , the nominator S’s public key pks , the nominee V ’s public and private key pair (pkv , skv ).
F can interact with the signer S by running Sig to request valid signatures on
polynomial-many adaptively chosen messages mi , can request the execution of
Conf and Conv for polynomial-many adaptively chosen strings, and finally outputs a forged message-signature pair (m, σ) with m ∈
/ {mi }. We say a convertible nominative signature is unforgeable, if for all such F , for any constant
c > 0, and for sufficiently large n, the probability that F outputs (m, σ) for
which at least one of Ver or Conf outputs 1 is less than n−c . That is,
h
Pr

i
(m, σ) ← F Sig, Conf, Conv (1n , pks , pkv , skv ) : m ∈
/ {mi }∧
< n−c .
(Ver(1n , m, σ, pks , pkv , skv ) = 1 ∨ Conf(1n , m, σ, pks , pkv , skv ) = 1)

Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of F , S, V , m and σ.
Definition 3 (Verification Untransferability). Let A be a PPT attacking
algorithm, which takes input security parameter 1n , the nominator S’s public/private key pair (pks , sks ), the nominee V ’s public key pkv , and a presumed
signature-message pair (m, σ) which is valid with exact probability 1/2. A can
request the execution of Conf and Conv for polynomial-many adaptively chosen
strings except (m, σ), and finally outputs either 0 or 1. We say a convertible
nominative signature is verification untransferable, if for any such PPT
algorithm A, for any positive constant c > 0, and for any sufficiently large n,
the following inequality holds:
¯ h Conf, Conv n
i
¯
A
(1 , m, σ, pks , sks , pkv )
−
¯ Pr
n
= Ver(1 , m, σ, pks , pkv , skv )

1 ¯¯
¯ < n−c .
2

Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, S, V , m and σ.
Definition 4 (Confirmation/Disavowal Untransferability). Let A be a
PPT attacking algorithm, which takes input the security parameter 1n , the nominator S’s public and private key pair (pks , sks ), the nominee V ’s public key pkv ,
and a target message-signature pair (m, σ) which is valid with exact probability
1/2. A can request the execution of Conf and Conv for polynomial-many adaptively chosen strings, where A can request execution of Conf with the nominee V
on the target pair (m, σ) but cannot request execution of Conv on (m, σ). Then,
at some point, the attacker A as the role of prover and a honest third party T
as the role of verifier engage in a confirmation/disavowal protocol Conf’, which
could be different from Conf, to confirm or disavow the given pair (m, σ). When
they stop, the third party T outputs either 0 or 1. We say a convertible nominative signature is confirmation/disavowal untransferable, if for all such
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A and Conf’, for any constant c > 0, and for sufficiently large n, the following
inequality holds:
¯ h
i
Conv n
Conf’Conf,
(1 , m, σ, pks , sks , pkv )
¯
(A,T )
−
¯ Pr
n
= Ver(1 , m, σ, pks , pkv , skv )

1 ¯¯
¯ < n−c .
2

Here, the probability is taken over the coin tosses of A, T , S, V , m and σ.
2.2 The Huang-Wang Scheme
We now review the concrete Huang-Wang nominative signature scheme [13],
which works in the discrete logarithm setting. In the following description, notation x ∈R X means that an element x is uniformly chosen from set X at
random, while k denote the concatenation of strings.
1. Key Generation (KG): Let p, q be two large primes such that q|(p − 1),
and g an element in Z∗p of order q. Assume that the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) in the group hgi is hard. The nominator S and the nominee V set their
public/private key pairs as (ys , xs ) and (yv , xv ) respectively, where xs , xv ∈R Zq ,
ys = g xs mod p, and yv = g xv mod p. In addition, a one-way hash function
H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq is publicly available.
2. Signature Generation (Sig): To generate a nominative signature σ =
(b, c, s) for a message m, the nominator S and nominee V jointly perform as
follows.
1) The nominee V first randomly picks R1 , R2 ∈R Z∗q , then sends (a, c) to the
nominator S by computing
a = g R1 mod p and

c = yvR2 mod p.

2) Upon receiving (a, c), the nominator S chooses r ∈R Zq , and sends (b, e, s0 )
to V by computing
b = ag −r mod p,
e = H(yv kbkckm),
(1)
s0 = r − xs · e mod q.
3) Then, nominee V checks whether both of the following equations hold:
e ≡ H(yv kbkckm) and

0

a ≡ g s yse b mod p.

(2)

If not, output “False”. Otherwise, nominee V outputs σ = (b, c, s) as the
nominative signature for message m by setting
s = s0 + R2 − R1 mod q.

(3)
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3. Verification (Ver): Given a signature σ = (b, c, s) and a message m, the
nominee V accepts σ as valid if and only if
(g s yse b)xv ≡ c mod p, where e = H(yv kbkckm).

(4)

4. Confirmation and Disavowal (Conf): For an alleged nominative signature
σ = (b, c, s) for message m, let e = H(yv ||b||c||m) and d = g s yse b mod p. The
nominee V uses Michels-Stadler’s protocol [15] to confirm or disavow the validity
of σ via proving logd c = logg yv or logd c 6= logg yv . Refer to Section 2.2 in [13]
for the detail how this proof is conducted interactively.
5. Signature Conversion (Conv): To convert a nominative signature σ =
(b, c, s) into a universally verifiable one, V just needs to release σ together with
a non-interactive proof π showing that logd c = logg yv , where d = g s yse b mod p
and e = H(yv ||b||c||m). Please check Section 2.3 in [13] to know how to generate
and verify the proof π.
6. Universal Verification (UVer): Anybody can verify the validity of (σ, π)
by checking that π is a correct non-interactive proof for logd c = logg yv , where
d = g s yse b mod p and e = H(yv ||b||c||m).

3 Security Remarks on the Huang-Wang Scheme
In [13], the authors provided some security arguments to show that their nominative signature scheme meets the three desirable security requirements: Unforgeability, verification untransferability, and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Note that those security arguments are informal explanations instead
of formal proofs, so the security of Huang-Wang scheme is not guaranteed in
fact: It may be secure or insecure.
As pointed out in [13], it seems that the unforgeability of Huang-Wang
scheme is related to that of Schnorr signature [17]. This can be informally
explained as follows. Let a PPT algorithm F be a forger, who is given the
security parameter 1n , the nominator S’s public key pks , and the nominee V ’s
public and private key pair (pkv , skv ). According to Definition 2, F ’s goal is
to forge a signature σ = (b, c, s) for a new message m. For this purpose, F
can adaptively choose messages mi and then run the interactive protocol Sig
with the signer, under the limitation that m is not equal to any mi . If F ’s
output (m, σ = (b, c, s)) is a valid message-signature pair, we have (g s yse b)xv ≡
c mod p, where e = H(yv kbkckm). By letting s0 = −s mod q, this implies
0
that the forger F can get a triple (b, c, s0 ) for message m such that g s ≡
−1
yse · (bc−xv ) mod p, where e = H(yv kbkckm). This triple (b, c, s0 ) is very similar
to a Schnorr signature (r, t) for message m so that g t = yse · r mod p, where
e = H(rkm). However, Schnorr signature is proved to be unforgeable if the
discrete logarithm is hard [16]. So it is likely that Huang-Wang scheme is also
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unforgeable, though elaborated work is needed to formally prove this result by
using the forking lemma proposed in [16].
For other two security requirements, however, it is another story. In the following sections, we present some direct attacks to show that the Huang-Wang
scheme satisfies neither verification untransferability nor confirmation/disavowal
untransferability.
3.1 Verification Untransferability
In [13], the authors argued that the Huang-Wang scheme satisfies the verification untransferability, because both of the following two statements hold:
(a) A presumed signature σ = (b, c, s) is valid for a message m ⇐⇒ logg yv =
logd c, where d = g s yse b mod p for e = H(yv ||b||c||m). However, without
the knowledge of both xv (nominee V ’s private key) and R2 (a random
number selected by V ) an attacker A cannot determine the validity of σ
unless it resorts to nominee V ’s direct help on pair (m, σ) or it can solve
the decisional Deffie-Hellman (DDH) problem w.r.t the tuple (g, yv , d, c).
(b) Michels-Stadler’s interactive protocol [15] is an untransferable zero knowledge proof for proving whether two discrete logarithm is equal or not.
However, we notice that neither of the above two statements are correct
(and shall be explained below). Moreover, based on this observation we can
mount a concrete attack on the Huang-Wang scheme so that the verification
untransferability is violated.
Statement (a) is invalid, because the attacker A can “solve” the DDH problem in this scenario. This is due to the fact that according to Definition 3, an
attacker A for verification untransferability is allowed to access DDH oracle
by running Conf with nominee V . Hence, for given (d, c) attacker A can know
¯ c̄) is a DH tuple,
whether (g, yv , d, c) is a DH tuple by asking V whether (g, yv , d,
R̄2
R̄2
¯
where d = dg and c̄ = cyv mod p are set by the attacker for some randomly
chosen number R̄2 .
Actually, using the above fact we identify an concrete attack to show that
the Huang-Wang scheme is not verification untransferable. In this attack, we
assume the attacker A has the knowledge of nominator S’s private key sks . Note
that this is consistent with Definition 3, which formally specified the verification
untransferability. In other words, the nominator S is also allowed to be an
attacker for this security requirement. Now, we describe the attack in detail.
Attack 1. To check whether an alleged nominative signature σ = (b, c, s) is
valid for a message m, the attacker A (or the nominator S) can perform as
follows.
1. A first selects another message m̄, and two random numbers R̄1 , R̄2 ∈R Z∗q .
2. Then, using xs the attacker A can compute a triple σ̄ = (b̄, c̄, s̄) by
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b̄ = bg R̄1 mod p,
c̄ = cyvR̄2 mod p,
s̄ = s + xs (e − ē) + (R̄2 − R̄1 ) mod q,

(5)

where e = H(yv ||b||c||m) and ē = H(yv ||b̄||c̄||m̄).
3. Finally, A interacts with the nominee V to check the validity of messagesignature pair (m̄, σ̄). The attacker A concludes that the presumed messagesignature pair (m, σ) is valid, if (m̄, σ̄) is valid. Otherwise, A concludes
(m̄, σ̄) is invalid.
The correctness of Attack 1 can be justified as follows. According to Eq.(5),
we have
g s̄ ysē b̄ = g s yse−ē g R̄2 −R̄1 ysē bg R̄1 mod p
= (g s yse b)g R̄2 mod p.
Therefore, (m, σ) is valid ⇔ [∃R2 s.t. g s yse b = g R2 mod p ∧ c = yvR2 mod p] ⇔
[g s̄ ysē b̄ = g R̄2 +R2 mod p ∧ c̄ = cyvR̄2 = yvR̄2 +R2 mod p] ⇔ (m̄, σ̄) is valid.
Now, we return to Statement (b): It is also false, since Michels-Stadler’s
protocol [15] is not zero-knowledge, as first pointed out by Camenisch and Shoup
(See Section 5 of [3]). Namely, (in our setting) the value of dxv is additionally
revealed in the case of logg yv 6= logd c and the verifier dishonestly selects d such
that he knows logg d. This weakness shall naturally affect the formal security
of the Huang-Wang scheme, though we do not any find direct attack by using
it 1 .
3.2 Confirmation/Disavowal Untransferability
According to Definition 4, the confirmation/disavowal untransferability requires
that given a presumed message-signature pair (m, σ), any PPT attacker A (including the nominator S but not the nominee V ) cannot convince a third party
T to accept the validity or invalidity of this pair (m, σ), where A is allowed to
run Conf with V on any string and Conv with V on any string other than the
target (m, σ).
However, we find out that using Attack 1 against verification untransferability as a subroutine, we can break the confirmation/disavowal untransferability
as well. We now briefly present this attack.
Attack 2. To convince a third party T accepting the validity or invalidity of a
target message-signature pair (m, σ), an attacker (who knows the private key
xs of the nominator S) can perform as follows.
1. From the given pair (m, σ), the attacker A first creates a new messagesignature pair (m̄, σ̄) as in Attack 1 (see Eq. (5)).
1

In the submission version of this paper, we did showed “an attack” by employing
this flaw in the ZK protocol. However, when preparing this final version we noticed
that “this attack” is actually invalid since it requires the attacker know the value
of logg d, i.e., the random number R2 selected by the nominee.
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2. After that, A asks the nominee V to convert (m̄, σ̄). Therefore, A can get
a non-interactive proof π̄ that shows whether σ̄ is a valid signature for
message m̄.
3. Then, the attacker A forwards (m̄, σ̄, π̄, π 0 ) to the third party T , where π 0 is a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof showing that σ̄ = (b̄, c̄, s̄) is properly
generated according to Eq. (5), i.e., A knows that there are two random
numbers (R̄1 , R̄2 ) so that the following conditions hold simultaneously:
b̄/b = g R̄1 mod p ∧ c̄/c = yvR̄2 mod p ∧ g s̄ ysē b̄/(g s yse b) = g R̄2 mod p.

(6)

4. Finally, the third party T validates whether π 0 is a correct proof for Eq. (6).
If no, halt. Otherwise, T further checks whether (σ̄, π̄) is valid for message
m̄. If yes, T concludes (m, σ) is valid. Otherwise, (m, σ) is invalid.
Note that using the well-known technique called signature proof of knowledge
[2], it is very easy for A to issue proof π 0 for Eq. (6). Alternatively, A can run
an interactive protocol with T to prove that the conditions in Eq.(6) hold.
Moreover, during this procedure it is infeasible for T to derive xs since this
proof is zero-knowledge.
The correctness of Attack 2 is almost obvious, since (m̄, σ̄) and (m, σ) have
the same validity or invalidity and the attacker does not ask the nominee V
to convert σ at all. Therefore, Attack 2 breaks the confirmation/disavowal untransferability of Huang-Wang scheme. That is, at least for the nominator the
Huang-Wang is not confirmation/disavowal untransferable.
3.3 Countermeasures
As we mentioned above, the Huang-Wang scheme employs a flawed building
block: Michels-Stadler’s protocol, which is designed to prove whether or not
two discrete logarithms are equal. However, this protocol is not zero-knowledge,
contrary to the claims made in [15]. To avoid this weakness, we can choose
two truly zero-knowledge protocols from [5] and [3] to prove the equality or
inequality of two discrete logarithms, respectively.
Moreover, according to the specification of confirmation/disavowal untransferability (Definition 4), in the setting of nominative signatures one should use
concurrent zero-knowledge (CZK) protocols rather than special honest-verifier
zero-knowledge (SHVZK) protocols [3]. The reason is that an attacker here may
act as an arbitrary cheating verifier during the execution of Conf protocol to
confirm or disavow an alleged nominative signature. Fortunately, by using the
techniques suggested in any of [7, 8, 10], we can easily transform SHVZK protocols from [5] and [3] to CZK protocols. Using such CZK protocols to confirm
or disavow nominative signatures, the confirmation/disavowal untransferability
can be guaranteed. Moreover, the formal proofs can be adapted from that given
in [1, 11], where the transcripts of verifying designated confirmer signatures are
also required to be untransferable.
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However, we do not find any effective countermeasure to prevent Attack 1
at this moment. In fact, we believe this is the essential security flaw of HuangWang nominative signature scheme.

4 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a security analysis of the Huang-Wang convertible
nominative scheme [13]. According to our results, the Huang-Wang scheme is
not secure, since it fails to meet two desirable security requirements: verification
untransferability and confirmation/disavowal untransferability. Specifically, we
presented two attacks to show that their scheme violates those two security
requirements. In fact, those two attacks are due to an essential design flaw in the
scheme. In addition, we also remarked that the Huang-Wang scheme employs
a flawed zero-knowledge protocol. Moreover, we pointed out the reasons why
their scheme is insecure. As the future work, it is interesting to consider how to
prevent our Attack 1 against verification untransferability and how to design
newly secure nominative signatures.
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